Consider a …rm that would like to commit to a focused business strategy because focus improves e¢ ciency and thus increases pro…t. We identify two general conditions under which tougher competition strengthens the …rm's ability to commit to a focused strategy. Under these conditions, competition fosters commitment for two reasons: (i) competition reduces the value of the option to diversify (the contestability e¤ ect) and (ii) competition increases the importance of being e¢ cient (the e¢ ciency e¤ ect). We use a number of di¤erent models of imperfect competition to illustrate the applicability of our results. Our examples suggest that the contestability e¤ect is very general. In contrast, the e¢ ciency e¤ect often requires further conditions, which are speci…c to the nature of competition in each model. In both cases, our analysis helps us predict when these e¤ects are more likely to be observed.
Introduction
Economic theories of business strategy often emphasize the importance of commitment.
Commitment is important not only because of its competitive and entry-deterrence e¤ects (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991) but also because it a¤ects a …rm's internal incentive structure (e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994 ; Van den Steen, 2005) . In particular, by committing to a strategy, a …rm may be able to incentivize employees to undertake strategy-speci…c investments in human capital or, similarly, to attract workers who possess such skills. However, such incentives can only work if employees are su¢ ciently con…dent that their investments are aligned with the …rm's strategy. A natural question is then: How can …rms commit to a given strategy?
This paper discusses the role of product market competition as one such commitment mechanism. We develop a framework that helps us to understand when more competition enhances a …rm's ability to commit to a focused strategy. Our key result is the identi…cation of two general conditions under which competitive pressure enhances a …rm's ability to commit.
To understand the logic underlying our results, consider a …rm that will have (or already has) an opportunity to operate in two segments (or markets): A and B. An example is a focused …rm considering broadening its scope, perhaps because of growth opportunities.
Alternatively, the …rm could be a diversi…ed …rm considering the possibility of exiting one segment, perhaps because its management believes that the …rm can be more e¢ cient if it is focused. In either case, at some future date, the …rm has to decide whether to be focused and operate only in A or to be diversi…ed and operate in both A and B. If the …rm chooses the focused strategy, its employees will have incentives to undertake investments (in human or organization capital) that are speci…c to segment A. However, such speci…c investments require employees to believe that the …rm will focus on A. If the …rm is unable to commit to the focused strategy, employees may not wish to undertake such investments, as strategyspeci…c skills are less valuable if the …rm chooses the diversi…ed strategy. This is essentially quently, as competition in that segment intensi…es, the …rm is more likely to pursue the focused strategy. We call this the contestability e¤ect. An interesting testable implication of the contestability e¤ect is that a …rm operating in one segment becomes more e¢ cient if competition increases in other segments.
The second e¤ect is observed whenever tougher competition in segment A makes investment in that segment more valuable. In the example above, A-speci…c investments reduce costs and help to deter entry. More generally, if focused …rms are more e¢ cient and thus better able to thrive under intense competition, commitment to a focused strategy may be more credible under more intense competition. We call this the e¢ ciency e¤ect. The e¢ -ciency e¤ect requires more stringent conditions than the contestability e¤ect. Intuitively, the e¢ ciency e¤ect has to contend with an opposing force: If competition su¢ ciently reduces pro…ts in segment A, the …rm gains little from specializing in that segment and thus any promise to focus on A has little credibility. Thus, for the e¢ ciency e¤ect to dominate this latter e¤ect, competition must not have a very strong negative e¤ect on the pro…ts of a focused …rm.
Our analysis is intentionally vague regarding the de…nition of "competitive pressure."
After we present the main example and our main results, we discuss a number of additional examples in which competition is modeled explicitly. Using di¤erent standard models of imperfect competition, we consider four di¤erent notions of competitive pressure: (i) threat of entry (the main example), (ii) the number of rival …rms in the industry, (iii) product substitutability, and (iv) mode of competition (price versus quantity competition). We demonstrate that the contestability e¤ect holds in all models that we consider, regardless of the de…nition of competitive pressure. The e¢ ciency e¤ect is also present in all of these models, but it often requires further conditions. Our examples illustrate the characteristics of the industries where the e¢ ciency e¤ect is likely to be of …rst-order importance: (i) the presence of few incumbent rivals, (ii) high product substitutability, and (iii) a signi…cant threat of entry.
We conclude the paper with an extension in which the …rm may choose between a ‡exible (or ex post pro…t-maximizing) and a committed (or visionary) CEO. This extension allows us to link our analysis to the leadership literature (for surveys of the most recent literature, see Veldkamp, 2010, and Hermalin, 2012) . We …nd that a leader's ability to commit is a less important managerial trait in highly competitive environments.
The reason for this result is that competitive pressure and "vision" (in the terminology of Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000 , and Van den Steen, 2005) or "resoluteness" (in the terminology of Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp, 2013) are both alternative mechanisms for conferring credibility to a focused strategy.
A Motivating Example. Although our model is not inspired by any particular company, its components and many of its conclusions can be motivated by, and are consistent with, the case of Intel Corporation and the choices it faced in 1984-85 (see Burgelman, 1994, and Casadeus-Masanell, Yo¢ e, and Mattu, 2010). Before its exit from the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) business in 1985, Intel was an active player in both the market for DRAM and the market for microprocessors. Although the production of each required similar competencies (e.g., competencies in line-width reduction), DRAMs required relatively more expertise in manufacturing (e.g., low-cost production) and less expertise in product design (e.g., mastering design complexity) than microprocessors. By the early 1980s, Intel found it increasingly di¢ cult to acquire a competitive advantage over its Japanese competitors. The situation was di¤erent for microprocessors, where it was possible to create speci…c capabilities in product design. By 1985, there was a clear discrepancy between Intel's o¢ cial business strategy, which was to continue to support DRAMs, and the actions of middle-level managers. These individuals had already begun to change practices, to refocus, and to acquire new expertise speci…c to microprocessor production. According to Burgelman (1994) , Andy Grove (then Intel's COO) recalled that: "By mid-1984, some middle-level managers had made the decision to adopt new process technology which inherently favored logic [microprocessor] rather than memory advances (...)." Eventually, Intel's management decided to exit the DRAM business entirely. This is an example of how competition can provide workers with incentives to undertake strategy-speci…c investments. In this example, as the market for DRAMs became increasingly contested, middle-managers understood that Intel would need to refocus on microprocessors and thus began to undertake microprocessor-speci…c investments, even before Intel exited the DRAM market. This is an example of the contestability e¤ect.
Another interesting observation is that Intel's o¢ cial strategy was to support both products. Middle-managers, however, behaved as if Intel was likely to change its strategy. As in our model, what mattered was not the o¢ cial strategy but which strategy was more likely to be implemented given the existing competitive pressures. 1 It is more di¢ cult to identify explicit examples of the e¢ ciency e¤ect. The primary empirical implication of the e¢ ciency e¤ect -that competition in a market tends to make incumbent …rms more e¢ cient -is a well-documented empirical fact in the industrial organization literature (see, e.g., the survey by Holmes and Schmitz, 2010 , and the discussion in the next section). It is, however, di¢ cult to isolate the exact mechanism by which this occurs. Separating the e¢ ciency e¤ect from other e¤ects linking competition to productivity requires additional tests. Our analysis provides a starting point for designing such tests, as we brie ‡y discuss in our concluding remarks. The microprocessor market at the time of the Intel case exhibited some of the characteristics of an industry in which the e¢ ciency e¤ect could also be found. First, we obviously need a market in which speci…c investments can increase pro…tability, and the microprocessor market had this property. Second, this was a market with few incumbent players, with relatively high product substitutability, and 1 An objection that could be raised against this interpretation is the possibility that Intel's "o¢ cial strategy,"as communicated to outsiders, di¤ered from the strategy communicated to insiders. Although we have no way of verifying this, Burgelman's (1994) narrative of the case explicitly states that Intel's top management not only supported its o¢ cial strategy internally (in board meetings) but also that Intel promoted this strategy through concrete actions (e.g., it maintained a high level of funding for DRAM technology development relative to other businesses). Casadeus-Masanell, Yo¢ e, and Mattu's (2010) narrative of Intel's strategy similarly suggests that (at least some) managers working for Intel in the early 1980s did not receive clear signals (or regarded the signals they did receive as unclear) concerning Intel's future strategy with respect to DRAMs. Again, an inability (or lack of intent) to commit to a speci…c strategy required subordinates to assess the likelihood of the various options in the context of competitive pressures.
with few or no (exogenous) barriers to entry. Our analysis reveals that all of these three characteristics are associated with the prevalence of the e¢ ciency e¤ect.
As none of our analysis depends on a company's current market position, it equally applies to diversi…ed …rms that are considering adopting a focused approach (such as Intel) and to the common case of a focused …rm that eventually decides to diversify, e.g., for growth reasons.
Related Literature
Our model belongs to the literature initiated by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) , who discuss the bene…ts of committing to a narrow business strategy in a context in which workers exert e¤ort to produce innovations. 2 Because workers are only compensated if the innovations that they discover are implemented, a …rm may wish to commit to a narrow strategy to induce e¤ort ex ante. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) propose that the employment of a CEO with a "vision"is a possible solution to this commitment problem. In a similar vein, Van den Steen (2005) demonstrates that the employment of a visionary CEO provides direction, improves coordination, and allows the …rm to attract employees with similar beliefs, who will thus be more productive. 3 A common element in this literature is the absence of competitive interactions; all of these papers model the …rm in a quasi-monopolistic setting. Naturally, then, they do not consider the impact of product market competition on the credibility of commitment to a particular strategy. Our contribution is to embed this commitment problem in a model in which the …rm may face di¤erent forms of competitive pressure.
In a broader sense, our paper is also related to the literature on the possible connections between product market competition and within-…rm frictions that hamper productivity.
Early concerns that lack of competition may lead to ine¢ ciencies were expressed by Hicks (1935) , who famously stated that "the best of all monopoly pro…ts is a quiet life" (p.8),
and Leibenstein (1966) , who coined the term "X-ine¢ ciencies"to describe the ine¢ ciencies arising from a …rm's failure to minimize costs. Modern analyses of the link between competition and internal e¢ ciency can be found in Hart (1983) , Raith (2003) , Schmidt (1997) , and
Holmes, Levine and Schmitz (2012), among others.
To the best of our knowledge, the link between commitment and the intensity of product market competition has not been formalized before. However, the industrial organization (IO) literature addresses the question of how product market competition a¤ects a …rm's incentives to increase productivity. A comprehensive formal treatment and review of this related literature can be found in Vives (2008) , who identi…es the conditions under which an increase in the intensity of product market competition positively a¤ects the value of a cost-reducing investment. Vives (2008) …nds that such a link cannot be established in general and depends on the speci…cs of the respective model. Our approach is similar to his, in the sense that we seek general conditions under which competition fosters commitment.
In particular, in Section 6, we provide examples of di¤erent models in which competition can foster commitment. Although the models that we present are speci…cally tailored to our question (e.g., heterogeneous …rms and discrete cost reductions), and thus di¤er from those Vives (2008) examines, the intuition underlying some of our conditions are related to his results, as we explain in Section 6. To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical IO literature on competition and productivity does not study the relevance of commitment to speci…c strategies or, in particular, the impact of competition on multi-market …rms, both of which are central to our analysis. 4 Holmes and Schmitz (2010) provide an overview of empirical studies and cases that illustrate the impact of competition on productivity. Of particular interest are studies reporting that competition leads to productivity improvements within …rms. Further relevant to our work are studies showing that some productivity gains can be attributed to investments in human or organization capital. An example is Schmitz (2005) , who shows that an increase in competition driven by Brazilian iron ore producers led to productivity gains among US and Canadian iron ore producers in the early 1980s. He also concludes that a substantial proportion of these gains were caused by changes in work practices within …rms. Although
Schmitz does not provide evidence on the mechanism linking competition to productivity gains, he speculates that commitment problems may be among the reasons that such gains could not be achieved in the absence of competition (see Schmitz, 2005 , p. 619). 
Setup
We describe our model in two steps. First, we explain our modeling of the organization.
Then we describe the organization's external environment: its demand conditions and the structure of competition.
Organization
We consider a …rm, called F , that can produce two di¤erent products, A and B (also referred to as segments or markets), solely using human capital. Speci…cally, production requires a CEO and a worker; both are indi¤erent to risk. The worker can make investments in human capital (e.g., the worker can exert e¤ort to acquire new skills, learn and adopt new work practices, etc.) that allow the …rm to become more pro…table in segment A (e.g., the …rm can then produce A more e¢ ciently). Such investments are speci…c to segment A. Following the worker's investment decision, the pro…t-maximizing CEO chooses a strategy s 2 fA; ABg:
The CEO decides whether the …rm diversi…es (denoted s = AB) or focuses on segment A (denoted s = A). 6 The …rm chooses whether to produce both products simultaneously or to specialize (focus) on just one product. The pro…t from producing in segment A depends (among other things) on parameter c F 2 fc; c; cg; with c c c. 7 For simplicity, we refer to c F as the (marginal) cost of production (for A), but we could more generally interpret fc; c; cg as production at low, medium, and high costs.
Without the worker's speci…c investment the cost parameter is c. Speci…c investments reduce costs di¤erentially, depending on the strategy chosen by the …rm: If the …rm chooses s = A, the cost parameter becomes c; if it chooses s = AB; the cost parameter becomes c.
Intuitively, the worker cannot e¢ ciently use two di¤erent sets of skills; hence the …rm cannot fully exploit the worker's A-speci…c skills if the worker also has to produce B. For example, if the …rm expands its scope by broadening its target market, the skills that were useful to the (original) focused strategy may lose some of their value. Alternative interpretations of this assumption are also possible. We could follow Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) and interpret segment-speci…c investments as e¤ort to develop segment-speci…c ideas, which must subsequently be implemented by the …rm. In that case, a diversi…ed …rm might …nd it more di¢ cult to commit to implementing speci…c ideas, because it may have a larger set of projects from which to choose. 8 Formally, the worker has a binary choice variable y 2 f0; 1g with
1 if the worker undertakes A-speci…c investments, 0 otherwise.
For simplicity, we assume that the CEO observes y. 9 If the worker undertakes A-speci…c investments and the …rm is focused (i.e., if y = 1 and s = A), the worker receives an exogenous bene…t that we normalize to 1. Otherwise, the worker earns zero bene…ts. We assume that y is not veri…able (i.e., noncontractible); thus explicit incentive contracts that reward workers for undertaking A-speci…c investments are not feasible. As in Van den Steen (2005), this could be justi…ed by the di¢ culty of describing the nature of such investments.
We provide an additional discussion of these contractibility assumptions in Subsection 5.4.
We call the cost of A-speci…c investments e¤ort e 2 (0; 1). E¤ort is a noncontractible cost borne by the worker. As strategy implementation decisions are made after knowing whether the worker has invested, the worker's investment decision will depend on both e and the worker's belief regarding the likelihood of the CEO implementing s = A. Conditional on y = 1, the worker believes that the focused strategy is implemented with some probability, which we denote b 2 [0; 1]. More formally, b Pr (s = A j y = 1). Clearly, the worker 8 Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) discuss two models with such features. In the …rst model, ideas generated in one segment can also be used in the other segment. In such a case, ex post the …rm may choose to implement inferior ideas to economize on implementation costs (e.g., incentive costs). In the second model, the …rm is …nancially constrained and can only implement a limited number of ideas (because implementation is costly). In both models, if the …rm focuses on a segment, more and better ideas are implemented in that segment. 9 The observability of y simpli…es the analysis, but it is not a necessary assumption. If y is not observable, we have the same equilibrium that we describe below, as the CEO always knows y in any pure-strategy equilibrium. However, such an equilibrium would not be unique; there could be less-e¢ cient equilibria in which investment does not occur and the CEO always chooses to diversify. Thus, our assumption of the observability of y can be alternatively interpreted as an equilibrium-selection device, which selects the most e¢ cient equilibrium in a game in which y is not observable.
undertakes A-speci…c investments if and only if b e. The belief parameter b is a measure of the credibility of the …rm's commitment to A. A larger b means that workers are more likely to trust managers not to deviate from A, conditional on A-speci…c investments being undertaken.
External environment
There is ex ante uncertainty regarding which of the two segments (A or B) will have higher demand. De…ne the random variabled with support fA; Bg as the demand shock, and let 2 [0; 1] denote the probability that the realized value ofd is d = A. We interpret as the probability that segment A experiences a positive demand shock that is larger than that experienced by segment B.
10
We de…ne competitive pressure as a random vector C A ;C B , whereC x 2 fl x ; h x g for each x 2 fA; Bg. C x = h x denotes high competitive pressure in segment x; C x = l x denotes low competitive pressure (C x is the realization ofC x ). Let x 2 [0; 1] denote the probability of h x . For simplicity we assume thatd,C A andC B are independently distributed. Let 1a.
10 Our general analysis does not require demand uncertainty; thus in some examples, we will ignore demand shocks. Demand shocks are only necessary for a commitment problem to exist in the limiting case in which …rm F faces no competition (i.e., F is a monopolist). Because this is the standard case analyzed in the related literature, we assume the existence of demand shocks only to highlight the fact that, in our model, the commitment problem would exist even without competition. In the proof of Corollary 2 (in the Appendix), we present an example in which a commitment problem exists in a pure monopoly case. 1c.
Assumption 1 is merely de…nitional. Parts 1a and 1b state that pro…t is (weakly) larger after a positive demand shock d. We assume non-negative pro…ts to simplify the analysis, although this is not a necessary condition for any of our results. It is a natural assumption if the …rm can (at zero cost) shut down unpro…table divisions. 11 Part 1c states that pro…t is (weakly) decreasing in cost. Below, we demonstrate through examples that the aforementioned assumptions (in addition to being intuitive) are compatible with standard market games and di¤erent notions/measures of competition.
Timing
The timing of events is as follows:
At period 0, the worker decides whether to invest (i.e., y = 0 or y = 1) and pays cost e if y = 1.
At period 1, the CEO observes y. All uncertainty is fully resolved: Both the demand shock d and the competitive pressure states C A and C B are realized and can be observed by all.
At period 2, the CEO decides which strategy s 2 fA; ABg to implement. This decision becomes common knowledge.
At period 3 the cost parameter c F is determined, production takes place, products are sold in the market, and F 's pro…t is realized. 11 Note that if pro…t in segment A is negative, the diversi…cation strategy s = AB is interpreted as "shutting down A" or "not focusing on A." If l B B (B) < 0, the CEO would always choose to focus on A (or to shut down operations in all segments) and a commitment problem would not exist. In this case, the equilibrium is trivial and uninteresting, but our results are still valid.
Equilibrium
Our model represents a sequential game with incomplete information, and the equilibrium concept used is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. 12 At period 0, the worker chooses y without knowing the realizations of d; C A and C B at period 0. At period 2, the CEO chooses s after observing (y; d; C A ; C B ). Conditional on y = 0, the CEO chooses s = AB (because
. Conditional on y = 1, the CEO's optimal choice of strategy is a function
ABg such that (we assume that the CEO chooses A when indi¤erent):
A if
The CEO's strategy if y = 0 is irrelevant for the worker's optimal investment decision, as in that case the worker always receives zero. The worker's optimal strategy depends on the worker's equilibrium belief b , which must be consistent with the CEO's optimal strategy conditional on y = 1:
where Pr [x] denotes the probability of x. The worker's optimal decision y is then given by:
An equilibrium is fully characterized by (b ; y ) and the CEO's equilibrium strategy, which is given by (1) if y = 1 and s = AB if y = 0. The following proposition guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium:
Proposition 1 For any set of parameters (e; ; A ; B ), a unique equilibrium exists.
12 Although there is incomplete information, the informed party moves last; thus subgame-perfection is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee sequential rationality.
Main Example: A Firm Facing Potential Entry
To …x ideas, here we introduce our main example. In the next two sections, we will derive general conditions for the main e¤ects illustrated by this example and apply these conditions to other competition models.
Firm x denotes the probability of C x = l x ).
Proposition 2 In the main example, for any set of parameters (e; ; A ; B ) a unique equilibrium exists. The equilibrium belief b is weakly increasing in both A and B . The equilibrium is fully characterized by (3) and the following values for b :
A (B; 0) ; 
In cases 2, 4 and 5, b is strictly increasing in both A and B .
Consider …rst the e¤ect of B (competition in segment B) on b (the credibility of commitment). This e¤ect is easily explained by the fact that tougher competition reduces the expected pro…tability of segment B, and thus makes the diversi…ed strategy less attractive.
This is an example of the contestability e¤ect, which we will formally de…ne in the next section.
Next, consider the e¤ect of A on b (e.g., in cases 2, 4 and 5). The advantage of being focused is stronger when there is a potential entrant for A because, by being focused, F can deter entry and protect its monopoly pro…ts. 13 Thus, intuitively, as entry in A becomes more likely (i.e., as A increases), the incumbent is more likely to focus (s = A) to become more e¢ cient and deter entry in A. This is an example of the e¢ ciency e¤ect, which we will also formally de…ne in the next section.
Competition and Commitment: General Results
Our main example illustrates a case in which competition (in either segment) unambiguously fosters commitment. In this section, we consider the general model as described in Section 3. Our goal is to identify general conditions that give rise to the two e¤ects illustrated by our main example.
The Contestability E¤ect
In our main example, an increase in competitive pressure due to entry in segment B eliminates pro…ts in B, which decreases the value of diversi…cation. Tougher competition in B thus has a positive e¤ect on the credibility of commitment b . Here, we demonstrate that this intuition is general: Whenever competition reduces pro…tability in B, an increase in the strength of competition increases commitment to s = A. We thus consider the following condition:
Condition 1 For any given demand parameter d, (ex post) pro…t in segment B is (weakly) decreasing in the level of competition:
Condition 1 is nearly as innocuous as Assumption 1; it simply states that competition reduces pro…ts. 14 We call this positive e¤ect of B on the credibility of commitment the contestability e¤ect. Intuitively, because increasing competition in B reduces pro…ts in that segment, it reduces the value of diversi…cation and thus the focused strategy becomes relatively more attractive. In other words, increasing competition in B reduces the ex ante value of the option to diversify.
The E¢ ciency E¤ect
In our main example, the threat of entry in A also enhances the credibility of a focused strategy. This happens because, without being focused, the …rm could not generate pro…ts in A when there is an e¢ cient competitor, whereas under a focused strategy (and A-speci…c investments), the …rm earns monopoly pro…ts, i.e., the impact of the focused strategy on the …rm's pro…t in A is maximal in the more competitive scenario. This intuition can be generalized. Conditional on segment-speci…c investments (y = 1), a focused strategy makes the …rm more e¢ cient (i.e., cost changes from c to c). Such an e¢ ciency improvement typically makes the …rm better able to compete. If that advantage is stronger when competition is 14 We do not impose Condition 1 on segment A because it is not necessary for the analysis that follows. more intense, the …rm is more likely to choose the focused strategy. Thus, we consider the following condition:
Condition 2 For any given demand parameter d, improving cost e¢ ciency (i.e., changing from c to c) is more valuable under high competitive pressure:
As we will illustrate below, in standard models of competition, Condition 2 is often more demanding than Condition 1. This is because high competitive pressure in A may signi…cantly reduce
Hence, if the …rm's pro…t is always non-negative (e.g., because it can shut down production in A), the left-hand side of (5) is very small. Condition 2 is thus more likely to hold when this level e¤ect (i.e., the reduction of pro…t levels due to competition) is not too large. Note that level of pro…ts in segment A under high cost is always non-negative under our (implicit) assumption that one may always quit segment A. Thus, if We call the positive e¤ect of A on the credibility of commitment the e¢ ciency e¤ect. 15 
The Impact of Competition on Costs and Pro…ts
Assuming that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, we now summarize some additional results in the form of corollaries.
Because competition reduces the attractiveness of diversi…cation, the worker is more con…dent of being rewarded if he/she undertakes A-speci…c investments:
Corollary 1 The threat of tougher competition (i.e., an increase in A or B ) fosters strategy-speci…c investments.
Another interesting result is that competition can have a positive e¤ect on pro…ts. Specifically, an increase in competition may lead to a discontinuous increase in e¤ort and thus to a discontinuous decline in costs. This occurs if competition changes b from just below e to just above e. In some cases, pro…ts under su¢ ciently intense competition are larger than those in the absence of any competition:
Corollary 2 The threat of tougher competition may increase F 's pro…ts. In particular, a situation in which F faces some competition can be more pro…table than no competition.
Intuitively, an increase in competition can solve the CEO's commitment problem and induce investments in a more e¢ cient cost structure. Competition often reduces expected pro…ts everywhere but at b = e, where pro…ts jump upwards because of the elimination of ine¢ ciencies.
In addition, the worker's expected payo¤ is zero for b < e and b e for b e and is thus increasing in competition for b e. Thus, total production e¢ ciency, as given by the sum of the worker's and the …rm's payo¤s, may also strictly increase. This proves the following corollary:
The threat of tougher competition may increase the worker's surplus and total production e¢ ciency.
An interesting application of these results is that competition may increase productivity and pro…tability. These results suggest one (but not the only) channel through which competition can make …rms more e¢ cient. 16 
Contractibility Assumptions
As in the related literature, some degree of contractual incompleteness is necessary for our model to work. We have chosen the simplest possible setup to facilitate the exposition. Here, we provide a brief discussion of the key contractibility assumptions. We note, however, that many of the conclusions of our model are robust to di¤erent assumptions that allow for varying degrees of imperfect contractibility. We do not pursue such extensions here; these extensions are uninteresting and distract us from our main goal.
Commitment. Due to frictions in the contracting environment, we assume that the CEO is unable to commit to a given strategy at period 0, i.e., before the realizations of cost and demand conditions, and is thus subject to potential dynamic inconsistency problems.
That is, by assumption, we exclude any kind of contractual solution that would commit the CEO to a given strategy. Commitment problems are at the core of our model; thus we are only interested in cases in which contractual solutions for these problems are not possible (or are imperfect). This assumption is standard in the related literature, which is reviewed in Section 2. This assumption is also particularly realistic in our application, as concepts of "strategy"and "strategy-speci…c investments"are vague and di¢ cult to describe ex ante in formal contracts, although they might, to some extent, be observable and even easily understood by all agents.
In a similar vein, explicit contracts based on "implementation decisions" (i.e., cost reductions from c to c) are also not possible. Clearly, such contracts would allow for perfect commitment, and thus if these contracts are possible, commitment problems do not arise.
Here the intuition is the same as before; concepts such as "cost-saving practices" or "productivity gains"might be observable ex post but di¢ cult to describe ex ante.
Incentive compensation. Although explicit contracts on cost savings and strategy implementation decisions are di¢ cult to write and enforce, the …rm may indirectly achieve the same outcome by contracting on objective performance measures. For example, in the current version of the model, the problem of incentivizing segment-speci…c investments could be solved by o¤ering the worker some performance-based compensation, e.g., the worker could be o¤ered a share of the pro…ts. In practice, however, such contracts may not be su¢ cient, for a number of reasons. For example, pro…t-sharing may be costly to the …rm (i.e., pro…t sharing may leave rents to workers) if workers are protected by limited liability and have limited initial wealth to pay "entry fees." 17 Introducing such frictions into the model is straightforward but requires more structure and notation without providing bene…ts. 18 
Applicability and Di¤erent Notions of Competition
In this section, we consider three standard market games as subgames in period 3. In particular, we consider market games in which high competitive pressure is de…ned as a state such that: (i) there is a large number of competitors, (ii) product substitutability is high or (iii) …rms compete on prices (Bertrand-style) rather than quantities (Cournotstyle). Because we abstract from demand shocks, we drop all references to d for notational simplicity. All derived insights remain valid if we allow for demand uncertainty, as in the general framework of the previous section. In all examples that follow, it can be easily veri…ed that Assumption 1 holds.
Number of Competitors
We model strategic interaction as Cournot competition, i.e., in each segment, …rms simultaneously choose output quantities for a homogeneous good. F 's marginal cost of production in A is given by c A 2 fc; c; cg; c < c; in B it is always c B = c. That is, its cost is c A = c if y = 1 and s = A and c A = c otherwise. We do not make any assumptions on c: All other …rms have constant marginal costs of c c: Cost c may be higher or lower than c, i.e., F may or may not be in a disadvantageous position in the industry.
Prices are given by a symmetric system of inverse demand functions:
x 2 fA; Bg, where Y x denotes total industry output in x and P x denotes the market price.
To guarantee strictly positive output levels, we require > max(c; c). The total number of …rms in x is given by n x 2 fn; ng with 2 n < n. In state C x = l x , there are n …rms in
x, and in state C x = h x , there are n …rms in x. To guarantee that all …rms receive positive pro…ts in equilibrium, we require the additional technical assumptions that nc +(n 1) c and c c < c.
F 's equilibrium pro…t is given by
It is easy to see that Condition 1 holds because
< 0. Thus, the contestability e¤ect implies that competition in segment B fosters commitment.
To verify Condition 2, note that
where c A is either c or c. Note that c A has two opposing e¤ects on this derivative. Low cost c A = c reduces the competitive advantage e¤ect (as de…ned above), which attenuates the neg- 19 The calculation is standard and can be found in Belle ‡amme and Peitz (2010), p.55.
ative e¤ect of competition on pro…ts. However, low-cost …rms also have larger pro…ts for any given level of competition, which implies a stronger level e¤ect (as de…ned above), which in turn ampli…es the negative e¤ect of competition on pro…ts. Intuitively, tougher competition may have a stronger negative e¤ect on pro…ts for low-cost …rms precisely because these …rms begin at a higher pro…t level. Whether Condition 2 holds depends on the relative contribution of these two e¤ects. In particular, the level e¤ect is dominated when competition is not excessively strong. Speci…cally, algebra reveals that if n < (a c) = [(a c) (c c) (c c)], the competitive advantage e¤ect dominates the level e¤ect. 20 We conclude that, in this example, the e¢ ciency e¤ect is more likely to be of …rst-order importance if there are few incumbent rivals in the industry.
Product Substitutability
Here, we model strategic interaction as Cournot competition with heterogeneous goods. 
where x , x 2 fA; Bg, is the degree of substitutability between the goods of the two …rms in each segment. We set x = in state C x = h x and x = in state C x = l x , with 0 < < 1. Equilibrium pro…ts for F are:
Again, the contestability e¤ect holds because 
which is positive if and only if A is su¢ ciently large. The e¢ ciency e¤ect thus holds for su¢ ciently large because higher product substitutability is less of a problem for low-cost …rms; more e¢ cient …rms …nd it easier to steal customers from competitors as products become more substitutable. 22 That is, as product substitutability increases, the competitive advantage e¤ect becomes stronger and may eventually o¤set the level e¤ect.
Price and Quantity Competition
Competition in prices (i.e., Bertrand competition) is typically …ercer than competition in quantities (Cournot competition). 23 Here we use the setup and notation of the previous subsection with A = B = 2 [0; 1). In state C x = l x , i.e., when …rms in segment x play a Cournot game, F 's equilibrium pro…ts are results are similar to those found in Vives (2008) , who shows that higher product substitutability tends to increase the value of a cost reduction. 23 We can interpret Cournot competition as competition in capacity-constrained markets (see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) .
In state C x = h x …rms compete by simultaneously setting prices and the resulting demand is given by the inverse of (6) . Firm F 's equilibrium pro…ts are given by
Because of
B (c) < 0, Condition 1 and the contestability e¤ect hold, and the credibility of commitment is enhanced by competition in B.
To verify Condition 2, note that (after some algebra)
the sign of which is in principle ambiguous. Condition 2 is satis…ed if the degree of product substitutability is su¢ ciently high, i.e. if 2 ( c) = (2 c c).
Competition versus Leadership Styles
As discussed in the literature review in Section 2, certain leadership styles may improve the …rm's ability to commit to a given strategy. In light of our previous results, an interesting question is how competition interacts with leadership styles.
Similar to previous papers (e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp, 2013), we now assume that there are two possible types of CEOs, each of whom has a di¤erent leadership style l 2 ff; vg: a CEO can be either ‡exible (type f ) or committed (type v -for visionary). The CEO's leadership style is common knowledge. A ‡exible CEO always selects the strategy that maximizes expected pro…ts at period 2, without any bias towards either A or AB (i.e., a ‡exible CEO behaves as in the previous sections).
In particular, a ‡exible CEO cannot credibly commit to either A or AB. In contrast, a committed CEO credibly commits either to strategy s = A or to strategy s = AB, We use our main example of a monopolist facing potential entry (discussed in Section 4), and for brevity of exposition, we assume = 0 and that the conditions for Case 2 in Proposition 2 hold. In this case, both the contestability e¤ect and the e¢ ciency e¤ect are at work. Also for brevity of exposition, here we only consider the non-trivial case in which a committed leader is committed to s = A.
If l = v (i.e., the CEO is committed to A), then the worker expects s = A with probability one, in which case the worker always invests because e < 1. The expected pro…t v is independent of A and B (as 
The optimal leadership style depends on the credibility of commitment b , which in turn depends on A and B . If b is su¢ ciently large, such that investment is always undertaken under a ‡exible CEO (i.e., if b e), a ‡exible CEO is trivially superior to a committed CEO: The investment is undertaken under either CEO, but only the ‡exible CEO maximizes pro…t ex post. In contrast, if b < e, the ‡exible CEO cannot motivate workers to invest.
The following proposition summarizes these observations: 
Concluding Remarks
There are some directions in which our model can be extended. First, our analysis similarly applies to cases in which strategy-speci…c investments improve pro…tability by increasing demand rather than by reducing costs. Second, it is possible to generalize our model to situations in which commitment also serves as a coordination device. In such an extension, to induce strategy-speci…c investments, competitive pressure must be stronger than that in the case of no coordination frictions.
24 24 Both such extensions can be found in on-line appendixes available at the authors'websites.
Our analysis provides clear predictions that could be assessed using data. The main empirical implication of the contestability e¤ect is that, when faced with increasing competition in a given segment or market for which e¢ ciency improvements are di¢ cult to obtain, a multi-market …rm: (i) eventually leaves that market and (ii) becomes more e¢ cient in the remaining markets in which it operates. Furthermore, a …rm operating in one market becomes more e¢ cient if competition increases in other markets. The main empirical implication of the e¢ ciency e¤ect is that, when faced with increasing competition in a given market for which e¢ ciency improvements are possible, a multi-market …rm: (i) focuses more on that market (i.e., ceases operating in other markets) and (ii) becomes more e¢ cient in the market in which competition has increased. The e¢ ciency e¤ect is more likely to be observed in certain industries, such as those with few exogenous barriers to entry, few incumbent rivals, and high product substitutability.
The related empirical literature, which we brie ‡y review, reports some evidence that is consistent with such e¤ects. However, this evidence is not unequivocal; it is only suggestive.
We hope that future work will test the implications of the model more directly.
then implies that belief b is uniquely de…ned by (2) and (1):
is an indicator function that equals 1 if x is true and zero otherwise. Once b is computed, (3) gives the worker's optimal decision y . The …rm's optimal strategy conditional on y = 0 is s = AB.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Existence and uniqueness follow from Proposition 1. First note that (as Y (P ) does not depend on the segment x) we have 
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows immediately from the e¤ects of A and B on b (Propositions 3 and 4) and from (3).
Proof of Corollary 2.
We construct an example that demonstrates both claims. Assume the setup of Section 4
and Case 3 of Proposition 2 with Holding A = 0, our goal is to …nd a set of parameters e; B > 0 and > e such that the 25 For example, these assumptions hold if we have Y (P ) = P; > c; > c and 2 < ( + c) 2 + ( c) 2 < ( + ) 2 , which can always be ful…lled by choosing a su¢ ciently large value for .
…rm's expected pro…t under these parameters exceeds M . Let As is decreasing in B 2 T , we have that for any B 2 T , > M .
Proof of Proposition 3
From (7), we obtain B (B), the optimal style can be either l = v or l = f depending on the speci…cations of the model. Because v is independent of A and B , f v is strictly decreasing in both A and B :
